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Become Casualties of the Trade Wars
I. Introduction
The United States, encouraged by environmental and
animal protection organizations, has been the major propo-
nent of effective measures to conserve whales.1 Japan, on the
other hand, has been the most outspoken defender of whal-
ing.2 A major confrontation between the two countries oc-
curred in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society.' The United States blinked.4 This pro-whaling deci-
sion by the United States Supreme Court had two significant
political and legal implications. It intensified the conflict be-
tween conservationists and whalers.' It also demonstrated the
Court's preference for deferring to the Executive Branch's in-
terpretation of its congressional mandate.
Japan Whaling asked the Supreme Court to determine
whether the Secretary of Commerce has discretion under the
Pelly6 and Packwood Amendments7 to negotiate with Japan
1. Note, Legal Aspects of the International Whaling Controversy: Will Jonah
Swallow the Whales?, 8 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 211, 212 (1975).
2. Id. at 212 n.8. See also, Note, The U.S.-Japanese Whaling Accord: A Result
of the Discretionary Loophole in the Pack wood-Magnuson Amendment, 19 Geo.
Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 577, 585 (1986)(authored by Andrew J. Siegal).
3. 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986). This case (No. 85-954) was consolidated with Baldrige
v. American Cetacean Soc'y (No. 85-955).
4. See Burgess, Japan Links Whaling Ban to Court Case, Wash. Post, Apr. 6,
1985, at Al, col. 6. See also Note, supra note 2, at 577 n.5.
5. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas Falkner of Greenpeace International requesting
public support (Feb. 1987). See also, Haberman, Japanese Whalers Face Heavy
Seas, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
6. Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protection Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978
(1982). The Pelly Amendment provides that "when the Secretary of Commerce deter-
mines that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing
operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an
international fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify
1
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over its whaling practices. The lower courts had held that the
Secretary did not have this discretion and must certify Japan
for its violations of the International Whaling Commission's
quotas.8 The courts had concluded that these violations "di-
minish[ed] the effectiveness" of international conservation
treaties and thus triggered the sanctioning process. ' The Su-
preme Court reversed. 10
This Note will describe and analyze the conflicting argu-
ments presented in Japan Whaling over interpretations of
the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. The Supreme Court,
reversing the lower courts, held that these amendments give
the Secretary of Commerce discretion to negotiate with Japan
over its future whaling practices, rather than certify it for its
past and present practices." The Note concludes that al-
though the Supreme Court claims to have decided this case on
pure statutory interpretation grounds, the 5-4 decision re-
flected a major policy choice. The Court recognized that, when
it comes to whaling, the Secretary of Commerce has an inher-
ent conflict of interest between his responsibility for the
health of United States commerce and his statutory mandate
to protect whales. He was given discretion to resolve the con-
flicts in his position. This Note recommends that, in light of
this deference to the Secretary, those citizens who believe that
the conservation of whales and other endangered species is as
important as concerns over international trade must convince
Congress to act to remove the Secretary's discretion.
such fact to the President." Id. § 1978(a)(1).
7. Packwood Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Packwood Amendment provides
that "the term 'certification' means a certification made by the Secretary [of Com-
merce] that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fish-
ing operations or engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling." Id. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i).
8. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 768
F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
9. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1410, afl'd, 768 F.2d at 428. See
also infra note 40 for an explanation of the certification and sanctioning process.
10. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
11. Id. at 2862.
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II. Background
A. Whaling
"There is probably no one group of animals which has the
significance of whales to world conservation."' 2 The rapid de-
cline of whale populations during this century is dramatic evi-
dence of the power of human technology to affect the environ-
ment on a global scale."3 During the nineteenth century, those
species of whales which could be killed by the slow whaling
boats were nearly wiped out. The whaling industry appeared
to be as close to extinction as the whales that supported it.
Yet, in the first four decades of the twentieth century more
whales were killed than in the previous four hundred years.'4
Technological advances available to whalers were respon-
sible for this incredible killing efficiency. Steam-powered
catcher boats, gun-fired harpoons with explosive heads, com-
pressed air pumps to keep dead whales from sinking, and the
modern factory ship to process the catch at sea revitalized the
twentieth century whaling industry.'5 Today, Russia and Ja-
pan are the only countries actively engaged in large-scale
whaling. 6
The whaling process has decimated the whale population.
Estimates place the pre-whaling population at 3.9 million
whales.' 7 By 1975, the population was reduced to 2.1 million. 18
Only 1.2 million of these were mature whales.' 9 However,
these figures underestimate the devastation. While the overall
12. Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises:
An Interdisciplinary Assessment, 6 Ecology L.Q. 326 (1977) (part 1) (quoting Talbot,
Remarks at the Presentation of the Albert Schweitzer Medal, Animal Welfare Inst.
Rep. 2 (Jan.-Mar. 1974)).
13. Hill, Vanishing Giants, 77 Audubon 56 (1975).
14. Scarff, supra note 12, at 346.
15. Id.
16. Together, Japan and Russia account for eighty percent of the captured
whales. Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, The Law and the Whale: Current Devel-
opments in the International Whaling Controversy, 8 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 149,
163 (1976).
17. Scarff, supra note 12, at 332.
18. Id.
19. Id.
1986]
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decline is forty-six percent,20 some baleen whale species such
as the bowhead and right whales have been reduced by over
ninety percent.21 The blue whale, the largest animal on earth,
has been reduced by ninety-nine percent. 22
B. The International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling
On November 20, 1946, representatives of fifteen major
whaling nations23 signed the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) 24 and created the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission (IWC).2 5 Since the treaty became
effective in 1948,26 the IWC has dictated the "rules" of inter-
national whaling management and conservation.27 The United
States, a founding member of the ICRW, and Japan are both
signatories to this treaty.2"
The signatories hoped that the IWC could effectively reg-
ulate whaling so that the whale stock could be maintained at a
productive level and the whaling industry could prosper.29
From the first, however, the whaling states favored short-term
economic gain and secured the approval of very high annual
quotas.30 The results are evident. The most valuable species
20. Id.
21. Id. at 330-31.
22. Levin, Toward Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 Nat. Resource Law. 549,
550 (1979)(citation omitted).
23. Signatory governments were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, South Africa,
USSR, United Kingdom and the United States. International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No.
1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW] (proclamation). (Publication of the
T.I.A.S. series was begun in 1950, two years after the United States signed this
treaty.)
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1717, T.I.A.S. No. 18___, 161 U.N.T.S. 76.
26. Id. at 1717, T.I.A.S. No. 18___, 161 U.N.T.S. 74.
27. Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past
and Reflections on the Future, 16 Nat. Resources Law, 543, 547 (1984).
28. ICRW, supra note 23. See also, Letter from Yasuchi Murazumi, Charge
d'Affaires ad interim of Japan, to Malcolm Baldrige, United States Secretary of Com-
merce (Nov. 13, 1984). For source information see infra note 61.
29. ICRW, supra note 23, preamble.
30. J.L. McHugh, the former chairman of the IWC, described the IWC's inability
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/9
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became commercially extinct.3' When the IWC finally ap-
proved lower quotas, it was unable to enforce them effectively
because the ICRW provides that a country which files an ob-
jection to a regulation or quota established by the IWC is not
bound by that regulation or quota. 2 In 1983, the IWC im-
posed a five-year moratorium on all commercial whaling be-
ginning with the 1985-1986 season to facilitate both the regen-
eration of whale stocks and scientific study. Only Japan,
Norway and the USSR filed objections to this moratorium.
However, under its rules, the ICW cannot require Japan and
the other objecting nations to honor the ICW's decision. 4
C. United States Enforcement Legislation for Marine
Conservation
The IWC's inability to promote conservation or even to
enforce its own quotas inspired a coalition of conservation or-
ganizations and aroused members of the public who lobbied
Congress to pass legislation that would protect marine ani-
to achieve the desired maintenance of whale stocks.
From the time of the first meeting of the commission established under the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946) in 1949 to the
disastrous meeting of 1964, almost all major actions or failures to act were
governed by short-range economic considerations rather than by the require-
ments of conservation.
Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, supra note 16, at 155 (quoting McHugh, The Role
and History of the International Whaling Commission, in The Whale Problem: A
Status Report 303, 306-07 (W. Schevill ed. 1974)).
31. "'Commercial extinction' is a term of art used to describe a resource which
has been depleted to such an extent that it would be unprofitable to further exploit
it." Note, supra note 2, at 582.
32. Note, supra note 1, at 218. See ICRW, supra note 23, art. V., para. 3.
33. Note, supra note 2, at 582.
The IWC schedule provided: [C]atch limits for the killing for commercial
purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pe-
lagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. The provision will be kept under
review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the
Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this
decision on whale stocks and consider modifications of this provision and the
establishment of other catch limits.
Id.
34. Id. See ICRW, supra note 23, art. V, para. 3.
19861
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mals.3 5 Congress' first effort toward this goal of protection was
the enactment of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972.36 Congress provided more effective enforcement provi-
sions in the Endangered Species Act of 1973,11 which pro-
tected the major commercial whale species on the endangered
list. 8 The protective legislation and listing effectively ended
commercial whaling by the United States and dried up the
United States market for whale products."'
However, these conservation acts did not halt foreign
whaling because the Japanese and Russian domestic markets
consume most of their whaling products." To strengthen the
United States' conservation position, Congress passed the
1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protection Act of
1967."' The Pelly Amendment authorizes the Secretary of
35. See Smith, supra note 27, at 554.
36. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1407 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987). This Act prohibits the
harassment, hunting, capture and killing of all marine mammals. However, there are
exceptions. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to issue permits allowing the
importation or taking of marine mammals for scientific research, public display and
incidentally during commercial fishing operations. Id. § 1371(a)(2). Alaskan Indians
are also given certain exemptions. Id. § 1371(b).
37. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987). This Act authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to develop a list of animal and plant species that are
threatened with worldwide extinction. Once the list has been published in the Federal
Register and the hearing process has been exhausted, the Act proscribes any inter-
state or international trade in a listed species. Id. § 1538.
38. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,320 (1970). See Smith, supra note 27, at 565 n.148. By 1978,
all major large whale species had been placed on the Endangered Species list. 43 Fed.
Reg. 58,030, 58,036 (1978). The Endangered Species list is now codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 222.23 (1986).
39. Levin, supra note 22, at 570. Levin points out that while this listing has
placed the United States in a strong position to advocate international whale conser-
vation, it has placed greater survival pressure on the smaller, unlisted Cetaceans. Id.
(The order of Cetaceans includes all whales, dolphins and porpoises. Id. at 553). See
also Smith, supra note 27, at 565.
40. See Levin, supra note 22, at 550-51; Note, supra note 1, at 213-14.
41. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982). The Pelly Amendment was passed as a result of a
dispute with Denmark over alleged overfishing of Atlantic salmon. See H.R. Rep. No.
468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2409, 2411-12. However, the Pelly Amendment protected whales as well as salmon. As
Representative Pelly said when he introduced the bill:
The saga of the Atlantic salmon unfortunately is being repeated around the
world with respect to many other creatures that inhabit the seas, most nota-
bly the whale. Commercial pressure has virtually wiped out the largest and
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/9
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Commerce (Secretary) to investigate the fishing operations of
foreign nationals, and to "certify" 42 a country if he determines
that its nationals are conducting fishing operations in a man-
ner that "diminishes the effectiveness of an[y] international
fishery conservation program. 4 3 Once a foreign country has
been certified, the President may direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit importation of fish products from the of-
fending nation." The Pelly Amendment allows the President
discretion in determining whether to sanction the offender.' 5
After passage of the Pelly Amendment, the Secretary of
Commerce had, by 1978, certified different countries on four
occasions for engaging in fishing operations which "dimin-
ish[ed] the effectiveness" of IWC programs.' Two of these
certifications involved violations of ICW whaling quotas. 1 Not
most awesome species of whale. The International Whaling Convention, far
from being a conservation measure, has proven to be a cloak for over-ex-
ploitation on a grand scale.
117 Cong. Rec. 34,752 (1971) (statement of Rep. Pelly.) See also H.R. Rep. No. 468,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 2409, 2412
(which reported that the bill " should not be geared exclusively to conservation of the
North Atlantic salmon, but should be applied generally to international fishery con-
servation programs").
42. Certification is the first step in a process designed to protect marine re-
sources. When the Secretary determines that foreign nationals are diminishing the
effectiveness of an international fishery or endangered species conservation program,
he "certifies" that fact by letter to the President. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1),(2) (1982).
Upon receipt of the certification, the President may authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish or wildlife products from the offending
country. Id. § 1978(a)(4).
43. "International fishery conservation program" means "any ban, restriction,
regulation, or other measure in effect pursuant to a multilateral agreement which is in
force with respect to the United States, the purpose of which is to conserve or protect
the living resources of the sea." Id. § 1978(h)(3).
44. Id. § 1978(a)(4). Furthermore, the definition of the "fish products", whose
import can be banned under this section, specifically includes marine mammals and
their byproducts. Id. § 1978(h)(4).
45. Id. § 1978(b).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 1029, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Cong. & Admin. News 1768, 1773.
47. Both Japan and Russia were certified under the Pelly Amendment on Nov.
12, 1974. Both took Antarctic minke whales in violation of the ICW quota. President
Ford withheld the sanctions when both countries agreed to accept the quotas in the
future. See Note, supra note 4, at 583-84 n.47.
On December 14, 1978, the Secretary of Commerce certified Chile, Peru and
1986]
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one of the certifications was followed by the imposition of
presidential sanctions. Instead, the President used the threat
of sanction to obtain promises of future compliance by offend-
ing nations.4
Congress responded to these Presidential actions by pass-
ing the Packwood Amendment "' to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976.50 This Amend-
ment removed the President's discretion to impose sanctions
once a country had been certified by the Secretary of Com-
merce.5 1 The Packwood Amendment sets the same statutory
terms for certification as the Pelly Amendment.52  Unlike the
Pelly Amendment, the Packwood Amendment mandates that
upon such certification sanctions will be applied. The Secre-
tary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce,
must reduce the fishing rights allocations within the United
States' two hundred mile fishery conservation zone (estab-
lished by the Magnuson Act)53 by at least fifty percent."'
Thomas Garrett, a former United States representative to the
IWC, stated that the existence of automatic sanctions has
been so effective that it is fundamental to the current system
of whaling controls.55
Korea for exceeding an ICW quota. These nonmember nations agreed to join the
ICW and abide by its quotas. Therefore, President Carter declined to sanction them.
Id.
48. See Preparations for the 34th International Whaling Commission Meeting:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1982).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1982) (also known as Packwood-Magnuson).
50. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
51. See 125 Cong. Rec. 22,084 (1979) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) ("In order to
improve the effectiveness of the Pelly amendment, [the Packwood amendment] will
provide for a specific penalty to result from certification.").
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e)(2)(A)-(D) (1982).
53. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1982).
55. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (1985) (quot-
ing Garrett Affidavit at 3).
[Vol. 4
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III. The Japan Whaling Association Case
A. Facts
In 1981, the IWC voted 25-1 to establish a zero quota for
certain Northern Pacific sperm whales. Japan cast the sole op-
posing vote.56 In 1982, the IWC ordered a five-year morato-
rium on all commercial whaling to begin with the 1985-1986
season.57 Japan filed an objection to the regulation and, under
IWC rules, was not legally bound to observe them.5 a However,
the Japanese apparently recognized that exceeding the whal-
ing quotas could lead to United States sanctions under either
the Pelly or Packwood Amendments." Such sanctions would
cost Japan an estimated two hundred thirty million dollars in
fishing revenue.6 0
Through its Charge d'Affaires in Washington, Japan ap-
proached Secretary of Commerce Baldrige in October 1984
with its concerns." After intense negotiations, Japan and the
United States concluded an executive agreement through an
exchange of letters between the Japanese Charge d'Affaires
and Secretary Baldrige. 2 Japan pledged to limit its catch of
56. Review of the 33d Int'l Whaling Comm. Meeting: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Rights and Int'l Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 11 (1981) (Prepared Statement of Thomas Garrett, Dep-
uty U.S. IWC Commissioner).
57. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2864
(1986).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Japan's fishing harvest in U.S. waters has been estimated to be worth nearly
five hundred million dollars. Japan Agrees to End Whaling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6,
1985, at 2, col. 4. Thus, a fifty percent reduction in Japan's quota would cost it almost
two hundred fifty million dollars.
61. Letter from Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d' Affaires ad interim of Japan to
Malcolm Baldrige, U.S. Secretary of Commerce (November 13, 1984) (discussing the
Japanese concern with the Pelly and Packwood Amendments). A copy of the letter
can be obtained either by contacting the United States Department of Commerce,
14th Street and Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230 or by reviewing
American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985) petition for cert.
filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3312 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1985) (No. 85-955) (App. K at 102a-03a). See
also Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1984, at A19, col. 1.
62. Letter from Malcolm Baldrige, U.S. Secretary of Commerce to Yasushi
Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan (Nov. 13, 1984) (discussing Japa-
nese harvest of sperm whales and acceptable catch limits); Letter from Yoshio
9
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sperm whales and other whale species, and to cease commer-
cial whaling by 1988.63
In return, and after consulting with the United States
Commissioner to the IWC, the Secretary determined that
the short-term continuance of a specified level of limited
whaling by Japan, coupled with its promise to discontinue
all commercial whaling by 1988, "would not diminish the
effectiveness of the International Convention for the Reg-
ulation of Whaling, 1946, or its conservation program." 64
Therefore, the Secretary agreed that he would not certify Ja-
pan under either amendment so long as Japan complied with
Okauara, Ambassador of Japan to Malcolm Baldrige, U.S. Secretary of Commerce
(Dec. 11, 1984) (stating catch limit for Japanese nationals and notifying that Japan
would withdraw its objection, filed on Nov. 9, 1981, to the quota imposed by the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling); Letter from Malcolm Bal-
drige, U.S. Secretary of Commerce to Yoshio Okauara, Ambassador of Japan (Dec.
11, 1984) (acknowledging receipt of Ambassador Okauara's Dec. 11, 1984 letter and
stating that Secretary Baldrige has decided not to certify Japan pursuant to the Pelly
or Packwood Amendments). These letters can be obtained from the Department of
Commerce, see supra note 60, or by reviewing American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige,
768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985) petition for cert. filed 54 U.S.L.W. 3812 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1985) (No. 85- 955) (Apps. L at 107a-09a, M at ll0a, N at lla).
The details of the agreement were contained in a summary attached to the corre-
spondence between the Charge d'Affaires and the Secretary.
First, the countries agreed that if Japan would withdraw its objection to
the IWC zero sperm whale quota, Japanese whalers could harvest up to 400
sperm whales in each of the 1984 and 1985 coastal seasons without triggering
certification. Japan's irrevocable withdrawal of that objection was to take
place on or before December 13, 1984, effective April 1, 1988 ... Japan ful-
filled this portion of the agreement on December 11, 1984.
Second, the two nations agreed that if Japan would end all commercial
whaling by April 1, 1988, Japanese whalers could take additional whales in
the interim without triggering certification. Japan agreed to harvest no more
than 200 sperm whales in each of the 1986 and 1987 coastal seasons. In addi-
tion, it would restrict its harvest of other whale species- under limits accept-
able to the United States after consultation with Japan - through the end of
the 1986-1987 pelagic season and the end of the 1987 coastal season. The
agreement called for Japan to announce its commitment to terminate com-
mercial whaling operations by withdrawing its objection to the 1982 IWC
moratorium on or before April 1, 1985, effective April 1, 1988.
Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2864 n.1.
63. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2865.
64. Id.
[Vol. 4
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its promises.6 5
During the negotiations, a consortium of conservation or-
ganizations opposed to whaling filed suit in district court
seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to cer-
tify Japan. 6 The district court granted the Japan Whaling
Association and the Japan Fishing Association the right to in-
tervene,67 but then granted the writ of mandamus.6 " There-
upon, Japan notified the Secretary of Commerce that Japan
would not withdraw its objection to the IWC moratorium, as
it had previously agreed, unless the United States obtained a
reversal of the district court's order. 9
B. The Lower Court Opinions Uphold the Conservationist
Position
1. The District Court Opinion
Judge Charles R. Richey of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia ordered the Secretary to certify Japan. 70 He
reasoned that the "case is a simple issue of statutory interpre-
tation." 71 Since he found the language of the key statutory
provisions to be ambiguous, 72 he turned to the legislative his-
tory of the Packwood and Pelly Amendments. He determined
that Congress intended the Secretary to certify any nation
65. Letter from Malcolm Baldrige to Yasuhi Murazumi (Dec. 11, 1984). For
source information see supra note 61.
66. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (1985). The original
plaintiffs to the action were: American Cetacean Society, Animal Protection Institute
of America, Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental Education, The
Fund for Animals, Greenpeace U.S.A., The Humane Society of the United States,
International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Whale Center, Connecticut Cetacean So-
ciety, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, and Thomas Garrett, former U.S.
Representative to the I.W.C. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2865 n.2.
67. The Japan Whaling Association and the Japan Fishing Association, trade
groups representing private Japanese interests, were allowed to intervene. Japan
Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2865 n.3.
68. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1411.
69. Letter from Shintaro Abe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, to Malcolm
Baldrige, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, (Apr. 5, 1985). For source information see
supra note 61.
70. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp at 1411.
71. Id. at 1410.
72. Id. at 1404-05.
11
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that violated an IWC quota.73 He also asserted that allowing
one thousand two hundred sperm whales to be killed over the
next four years would be a complete reversal of United States
policy.74
Judge Richey found that prior to this matter, the Execu-
tive Branch had clearly and consistently taken the position
that violations of international fishing quotas necessarily di-
minished the effectiveness of fishery conservation programs. 75
In support of his position, he cited Adams v. Vance, e the only
other case involving the Pelly Amendment. In that case, the
Secretary of State had argued that if the United States filed
an objection to an IWC quota (to allow the taking of a small
number of bowhead whales by Alaskan natives), they would
be imposing a serious threat to the effectiveness of the IWC.77
Judge Richey found that the Secretary lacked discretion to
avoid certification through negotiation or separate agree-
ment.78 Both the defendants and intervenors appealed the
decision. 9
73. Id. at 1407. Judge Richey stated that "[t]he legislative history and consistent
agency interpretation shows that any nation which exceeds the IWC quotas will be
viewed as acting to diminish the effectiveness of the IWC and will be certified, re-
gardless of the nations own view of the propriety of the quotas themselves." Id. at
1408-09.
74. Id. at 1407.
75. Id.
76. 570 F.2d 950 (1978). That case began when the ICW notified the United
States that to protect the bowhead whale from extinction, it planned to withdraw the
exemption by which the Alaskan Eskimos had been allowed to hunt these whales.
The Secretary of State announced he would not file an objection to the action on
behalf of the United States. The Eskimos sued to compel the Secretary to object
formally. The court held that such an order would substantially harm the United
States' efforts to promote conservation of marine mammals. Therefore, it would not
intrude into the "core concerns" of the executive branch. Id. at 954-55.
77. Id. at 956 n.13.
78. American Cetacean Soc'y, 604 F. Supp. at 1410.
79. After the District Court's decision, Secretary Baldrige certified the Soviet
Union for exceeding its ICW quota of minke whales in spite of warning from the
United States. He said that their violation triggered the Packwood Amendment's cer-
tification process. President Reagan decided not to enforce the sanctions. Note, supra
note 2, at 601 n.177.
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2. The Circuit Court Opinion
In a 2-1 decision written by Judge J. Skelly Wright, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision."' The court agreed that the Pelly
and Packwood Amendments did not define which activities
would "diminish the effectiveness" of the ICRW's program
and so it must look to the legislative history of the amend-
ments to ascertain congressional intent.81 It found that any
violation of an IWC quota would automatically trigger certifi-
cation.82 Furthermore, the court held that no Secretarial dis-
cretion exists when an IWC quota has been violated.8 3 It
stated, "we see no indication that Congress was either aware
of or acquiesced in such a practice. '84 The court also held that
the Packwood Amendment had not changed the Pelly certifi-
cation process but only provided mandatory sanctions.8
C. The Supreme Court Reverses
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Byron White, writing for the majority of a sharply
divided Court, reversed the lower courts.8 8 First, he addressed
the Japanese petitioners' contention that a federal court lacks
the judicial power to order the Secretary of Commerce, an Ex-
ecutive Branch officer, to dishonor an international agree-
ment.8 7 Justice White noted that the Court had previously
pointed out in Baker v. Carr88 that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
80. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (1985).
81. Id. at 436.
82. Id. at 442.
83. Id. at 440, 442.
84. Id. at 440.
85. Id. at 435.
86. Japanese Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
The Court reached a 5-4 decision for the petitioners on June 30, 1986. Justices
O'Connor, Powell, Burger and Stevens joined the majority opinion of J. White. Jus-
tice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun and
Rehnquist joined.
87. Id. at 2865.
88. 369 U.S. 186 (1985).
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beyond judicial cognizance."89  Furthermore, Baker had
plainly held that courts have the authority to construe treaties
and executive agreements.90 He found that the challenge to
the Secretary's decision not to certify Japan for exceeding the
IWC quotas involved a purely legal question of statutory
interpretation. 91
The Court's majority saw the issue in this case as
"whether, in the circumstances of these cases, either the Pelly
or Packwood Amendment required the Secretary to certify Ja-
pan for refusing to abide by the IWC whaling quotas. 92 It
noted that the Packwood Amendment requires that, before
certification, the Secretary must determine that foreign na-
tionals "'are conducting fishing operations or engaging in
trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness' of the
IWC." 93 However, "the statute does not define the words 'di-
minish the effectiveness of' or specify the factors that the Sec-
retary should consider in making the [certification] decision
entrusted to him alone." 94 The Court notes that before he
made a decision in this matter, the Secretary consulted with
the United States Commissioner to the IWC and reviewed the
IWC Committee opinions. 8 He then determined that the lim-
ited taking of whales in the 1984 and 1985 coastal seasons
would not diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW or its con-
servation program.96 Therefore, he did not certify Japan.
89. Id. at 211.
90. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2866. See also Baker, 369 U.S. at 212-13.
91. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2866.
92. Id. at 2867. The Court points out that the "circumstances" in this case in-
clude the fact that Japan had filed a formal objection to the ICW quotas and morato-
rium. Therfore, under the ICRW's "opt-out" rules, it was not breaching its obliga-
tions under the Convention. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. "Specifically, it does not state that certification must be forthcoming
whenever a country does not abide by IWC schedules." Id.
95. Appellant's Reply Brief, Baldrige v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct.
2860 (No. 86-955) (1986) (Affidavit of Malcolm Baldrige, App. III, Jan. 14, 1985).
96. Id. The Secretary determined that accepting Japan's pledge to limit its
sperm whaling and to cease all commercial whaling by 1988 would better serve the
ICRW's conservation ends than imposing sanctions and risk continued whaling by the
Japanese. Id. Furthermore, the Court points out that the Secretary is not urging that
he has carte blanche discretion to ignore violations of the ICW's quotas. Japan
[Vol. 4
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In considering whether the relevant statutory language
clearly directed the Secretary to certify automatically any na-
tion that violates an IWC whaling schedule, the respondents
and the courts below conceded that it did not.9 This Court
found that while the Pelly and Packwood Amendments might
be construed in this manner, the Secretary's view that these
amendments gave him discretion in these circumstances was
also a reasonable construction of the language in the stat-
utes. 9 The Court noted that its longstanding practice was to
defer to "the executive department's construction of a statu-
tory scheme it is entrusted to administer" '99 whenever the
statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue in question.'00
However, it will not defer if the legislative history of the stat-
ute clearly shows that the agency construction is contrary to
congressional intent.'0 '
The Court reviewed the legislative history of both amend-
ments. It found that there may be "scattered statements hint-
ing at the per se rule advocated by respondents, but read as a
whole, we are quite unconvinced that this history clearly indi-
Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2867.
97. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2867.
98. Id. The Court rebutted the finding of the court of appeals that S. Rep. No.
95-582 provided the necessary direction. Id. at 2868 n.5. That report stated that the
purpose of the Pelly Amendment was
to prohibit the importation of fishery products from nations that do not con-
duct their fishing operations in a manner that is consistent with international
conservation programs. It would accomplish this by providing that whenever
the Secretary of Commerce determines that a country's nationals are fishing
in such a manner, he must certify such fact to the President.
S. Rep. No. 582, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
The Court said that although this is an explicit statement of purpose, it is not
the operative language in the statute. That same report says that the operative sec-
tion directs the Secretary to certify to the President that nationals of a foreign coun-
try are conducting operations under circumstances that "diminish the effectiveness of
an international conservation program whenever he determines the existence of such
operations.. These are not the words of a ministerial duty, but the imposition of a
duty to make an informed judgment." Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2868 n.5 (em-
phasis added).
99. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2868 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455,
461 (1985)).
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cates . . . that all departures from IWC schedules, regardless
of the circumstances, call for immediate certification."' 2
Therefore, the Court concluded, the Secretary's decision to se-
cure the certainty of Japan's future compliance with the
IWC's program through executive agreement, rather than rely
on the hope that certification and sanction would produce the
desired result, was a reasonable construction of the Pelly and
Packwood Amendments. 10 3 Having found that Congess had
given the Secretary the authority to determine whether for-
eign nationals' whaling practices are diminishing the effective-
ness of the IWC, the Court would not impose a mandatory
obligation on the Secretary to certify every violation of IWC
quotas. 104
2. The Dissent
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented vigorously from the
majority opinion. He argued that the majority had found
"permissible exactly the result that Congress sought to pre-
vent in the Packwood Amendment: executive compromise of a
national policy of whale conservation. 1 0 5
Marshall says that the question here is not whether the
Secretary's decision to negotiate rather than certify was wise
or effective, but whether it was authorized.106 He finds that
the legislative history clearly establishes Congress' expectation
that substantial violations of whaling quotas would always re-
sult in certification. °10 Therefore, the Secretary has flouted the
express will of Congress and exceeded his own authority. 0 8
IV. Analysis
The Court in Japan Whaling first asserted that this case
"present[ed] a purely legal question of statutory interpreta-
102. Id. at 2871.
103. Id. at 2872.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2873.
106. Id. at 2874.
107. Id. at 2875.
108. Id. at 2874.
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tion."' 0 9 Next, the Court reaffirmed its longstanding position:
deference to an agency's interpretation of its statutory man-
date absent clear evidence that the agency was acting in a
manner contrary to the will of Congress in carrying out its
statutory mandate."0 The Court said that this clear evidence
must be found in either the statutory language itself or in the
legislative history."' Then the majority demonstrated its pro-
clivity for deference by ignoring the substantial evidence pro-
vided by the legislative history that the Secretary's actions
were contrary to congressional will.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have strongly sup-
ported a policy of "agency deference.""' 2 However, the Court
stated that a member of the Executive Branch may not act
contrary to the will of Congress in carrying out a statutory
mandate.13 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter.' 1  The Court found that the legislative history
of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments gave the Secretary of
Commerce discretion in deciding whether to certify a nation.
The Court cites Representative Pelly's testimony at the Sen-
ate hearings that sanctions were to be applied "in the case of
109. Id. at 2866.
110. Id. at 2868. It said, "if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
question at issue, our longstanding practice is to defer to the 'executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.'" Id. construing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1985).
111. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2868.
112. See, e.g., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 106 S. Ct. 565 (1986) (FDA
Commissioner's interpretation of statutory language is sufficiently rational so Court
will defer to it); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1985) (deference to Army Corps of Engineers' interpretation of Clean
Water Act); Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984) (courts should not interfere with
discretion of Secretary of Health and Human Sevices to determine how she should
comply with her statutory obligations).
See also Stever, Deference to Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmen-
tal, Health and Safety Litigation - Thoughts on Varying Judicial Application of the
Rule, 6 W. New Eng.. L. Rev. 35 (1983). The author, a former Justice Department
attorney, contends that virtually every brief filed on behalf of a government agency
whose action is being challenged contains the assertion that reviewing courts owe def-
erence to the agency. Id.
113. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2867.
114. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1985)).
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flagrant violation of any international fishery conservation
program to which the United States has committed itself."" 6
It quotes the House Report on hearings for the Packwood
Amendment in support of its position and points out that the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee recognized the
Secretary's discretion in making the initial certification deci-
sion." 6 This committee reported, "the trade or taking must be
serious enough to warrant the finding that the effectiveness of
the international program has been diminished. An isolated,
individual violation of a convention provision will not ordinar-
ily warrant certification under this section.""' 7
The majority approach presents a logical inconsistency.
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, the most significant
aspect of this case was that even the Secretary himself never
concluded "that the intentional taking of large numbers of
sperm whales does not diminish the effectiveness of the IWC
program." 1 8 In fact, several months prior to his action in this
matter, the Secretary had stated that the Japanese taking of
whales does diminish the effectiveness of the program." '
Furthermore, Secretary Baldrige stated that his decision to
reach an accord was based on his belief that United States
policy in support of the IWC Convention would be better
served by this accord than by Japanese actions if there were
115. Fishery Legislation : Hearings on S. 1242 before the Subcomm. on Oceans
and Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1971)
(statement of Rep. Pelly), quoted in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2869 (1986).
116. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2869.
117. Id. H.R. Rep. No. 1029, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1768, 1772, construed in Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2869 (1986).
118. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. Four months before the executive agreement that inspired this suit, Sen-
ator Packwood wrote to Secretary Baldrige asking for assurance that "any nation
which continues whaling after the moratorium takes effect will be certified under
Packwood-Magnuson." Id. (quoting Letter from Sen. Packwood to Malcolm Baldrige,
Secretary of Commerce (June 28, 1984)).
Baldrige replied, "[y]ou noted in your letter the widespread view that any contin-
ued whaling after the... (IWC) moratorium decision takes effect would be subject to
certification. I agree, since any such whaling attributable to the policies of a foreign
government would clearly diminish the effectiveness of the ICW." Id. (quoting Letter
from Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce to Sen. Packwood (July 24, 1984)).
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no accord.120 Apparently, the Secretary did not believe that
certification alone would necessarily deter the Japanese from
whaling for maximum yield. However, the legislative history
of the Packwood Amendment shows that Congress believed
that certification under the Pelly Amendment was mandatory
when serious violations of international treaties occurred. 21
But the Court held that since Congress had not specifically
mandated certification for the deliberate taking of whales in
excess of the IWC quota, certification was discretionary. 22
Clearly, the Court will not find an implied congressional in-
tent sufficient to override a conflicting interpretation by the
Executive Branch.
This case presented the Court with a difficult problem.
Congress has assigned the Secretary of Commerce the task of
protecting whales and other marine animals. 2 ' Congress has
120. Appellant's Reply Brief, Baldrige v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct.
2860 (No. 85-955) (1986) (Affidavit of Malcolm Baldrige, App. III, Jan. 14, 1985). The
legislative history of the Packwood Amendment shows that Congress believed that
certification under the Pelly Amendment was mandatory when serious violations of
international treaties occurred.
121. See, for example, an exchange between members of Congress and Richard
A. Frank, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration at
hearings prior to the passage of the Packwood Amendment. They were discussing the
meaning of the Pelly Amendment.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. [T]he certification is a mandatory act under the law. It is
not a discretionary act.
Mr. FRANK. This is correct.
Mr. BREAUX. I understand, Mr. Frank, that actually what we are talking
about under the Pelly amendment is a two-stage process. First, if a country is
violating the terms of an international treaty, the Secretary of Commerce has
to certify that he is doing that, and that is not a discretionary thing. But
after he certifies that there is a violation, and there is discretion on the part
of the President to impose any import quotas....
Mr. FRANK. That is correct. The first one is mandatory on the Secretary of
Commerce. The second is discretionary on the part of the President.
Fish and Wildlife Miscellaneous, Part 1: Hearings on Whaling Policy and Interna-
tional Whaling Commission Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wild-
life Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 301, 322-23 (1979).
122. Japan Whaling, 106 S. Ct. at 2867.
123. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1407
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1801-1882 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); Fisherman's Protection Act of 1967, 22
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also assigned this same Secretary the larger responsibility for
promoting and protecting the health of all United States com-
mercial trade.1 14 When another country's violation of IWC's
quotas becomes an issue in our trade negotiations with that
country (as it did with Japan),'2" the Secretary's inherent con-
flict of interest becomes apparent.
The Secretary cannot resolve this conflict to the satisfac-
tion of both conservationists and whalers. 2 ' The imposition of
sanctions against the world's major proponent of whaling
would be a major victory for the conservation movement. On
the other hand, Japan is culturally and economically commit-
ted to whaling at this time.2 7 Furthermore, Japan has sub-
stantial economic and political leverage in trade matters be-
cause of its fifty-eight billion dollar trade surplus with the
United States.' If the Secretary were to impose Pelly and
U.S.C. § 1971-1980 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987) (this Act is found under chapter 25,
entitled Protection of Vessels on the High Seas and in Territorial Waters of Foreign
Countries).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (1983).
125. See Burgess, supra note 4, at Al, col. 6 (stating that although the Japanese
agreement to end whaling in 1988 "was not formally linked to tense negotiations over
bilateral trade . . . underway between the [United States and Japan] . . . Japanese
officials see it as a major concession in the total picture of ties with the United
States"); Whale-Savers Challenged by Japanese, Wash. Post., Oct. 18, 1984, at A19,
col. 1 (maintaining that confrontation over whaling "could escalate into a serious
trade war between the United States and one of its best trading partners [Japan]").
126. Conservationists have not accepted the Secretary's assertion that Japan's
agreement to abide by the moratorium after 1988 would be more beneficial to the
conservation cause in the long run. They point to the fact that Russian and Japanese
whaling ships are old and too expensive to replace. See Hill, supra note 13, at 56.
Even the whalers admit that they have no plans to replace their soon to be retired
whaling fleets. See Rosa, What is Leviathan's Future? 7 Oceans, May-June 1974 at
49.
Therefore, the Japanese are eager to do as much whaling as possible while their
ships are still operable. Japan's whaling industry earns fifty million dollars per year.
Note, supra note 2, at 595 n.129. Amortization is an important factor in the Japanese
position. In addition, whaling is a matter of national pride to the Japanese and such
matters are significant to them in determining international positions. However, the
Japanese argument that the moratorium will deprive them of an important food
source is belied in this case by the fact that sperm whales, the key animals here, are
inedible. Rosa, supra, at 50.
127. See Note, supra note 2, at 585 n.57 and accompanying text.
128. Farnsworth, Mounting Conflict Over Trade Looms For U.S. and Japan,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1987 at Al, col. 4.
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Packwood sanctions on Japan, Japan has the power and the
will to retaliate. 129
If the Court does not defer to the Secretary's interpreta-
tion of his statutory mandate, it severely restricts the flexibil-
ity he needs to do an admittedly complex job. Yet, the Court
must review his decisions to determine whether he has com-
plied with the will of Congress. The underlying policy decision
here lies with Congress, not the Court. This case plainly indi-
cates that marine mammal conservation programs are vulner-
able to destruction by powerful economic interests.
If Congress still believes that preservation of whales and
other marine animals is as important as trade concerns, it
must make that clear in the statutory language. If Congress
wishes to leave discretion with the Secretary, it need do noth-
ing. This difference in priorities is clearly reflected in the dis-
parate majority and minority interpretations of the same leg-
islative history.
The Court has said, "deference is particularly appropriate
where, as here, an agency's interpretation involves issues of
considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted
to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.' 0
Therefore, Congress must act to amend the Pelly and
Packwood Amendments if it wishes to protect the whale from
devastation in trade wars. It must specify that violations of
IWC quotas will result in mandatory certification and sanc-
tions. As Justice Marshall said, "[s]ince 1971, Congress has
sought to lead the world, through the repeated exercise of its
power over foreign commerce, in preventing the extermination
of whales and other threatened species of marine animals. I
deeply regret that it will now have to act again before the Ex-
129. Japan has threatened to stop United States fish exports to Japan. Note,
Enforcement Questions of the International Commission on Whaling; Are Exclusive
Economic Zones the Solution? 14 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 114, 140 (1984). This action
would destroy the market for two-thirds of the output of the Alaskan fish processing
industry. Some believe that Japan might also revoke its salmon fishing treaties with
the United States. Id. This would cost the United States one hundred million dollars
in trade. Id.
130. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
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ecutive Branch will finally be compelled to obey the law."'13'
V. Conclusion
Although the Court claims to have decided this case
purely on the grounds of statutory interpretation, this 5-4 de-
cision reflected a major Court policy - deference to the Exec-
utive Branch. It reflected a determination that the Secretary
of Commerce needs flexibility to deal with his conflicting re-
sponsibilities. Since Congress did not specifically restrict this
flexibility by mandating certification of IWC quota violations,
the Court would not intervene. The minority shows greater
concern for the impact of the Secretary's actions on the con-
servation of whales.
In light of the continuing Court deference to the Execu-
tive Branch, conservation-minded citizens must turn to Con-
gress. Once more they must amend the statutes and provide
precise protective measures for the whale. As Justice Marshall
said in dissent, the question here has been long pondered:
"whether Leviathan can long endure so wide a chase, and so
remorseless a havoc; whether he must not at last be extermi-
nated from the waters, and the last whale, like the last man,
smoke his last pipe, and then himself evaporate in the final
puff."132
Virginia A. Curry
131. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2872
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2872 (quoting H. Melville, Moby Dick 423 (Bantam Classic ed. 1981)).
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